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Klaus Holzkamps Rezeption in Nordamerika: Eine Begegnungsgeschichte
Als Herausgeber von Mind, Culture, and Activity, einer führenden englisch-
sprachigen Zeitschrift, die dem kulturhistorischen Ansatz gewidmet ist und die
dieses Engagement in ihrem Namen trägt, lese ich sehr viele Artikel und erfahre
daher, wie Autoren aus allen Teilen der Welt ihre Forschungsobjekte und For-
schungstätigkeiten theoretisieren. Aus diesem Blickwinkel kann ich sagen, dass
nur sehr wenige Autor(In)en während des letzten Jahrzehnts auf das Werk Klaus
Holzkamps zurückgegriffen oder verwiesen haben. In diesem Aufsatz stelle ich
meine persönliche Begegnung mit Holzkamps Werk sowie meine Begegnungen
mit denjenigen die ihn persönlich kannten oder mit ihm gearbeitet haben, dar.
Ich befasse mich im Besonderen mit den Überschneidungen seines Werkes mit
den Werken anderer Denker, mit denen ich mich vor meinem Aufgreifen von
Holzkamps Arbeiten beschäftigt habe. Diese anderen Werke waren für mich
Momente, die mein eigenes Lesen vermittelten, und daher auch meine Einschät-
zung der »Grundlegung der Psychologie« geprägt haben. Im Gegensatz zu anderen
Autoren, die die Kritische Psychologie und das Werk und Projekt Holzkamps
im Untergehen sehen, glaube ich, dass es noch sehr viel zu tun gibt um seine
Gedanken und Theorien durch einen Prozess tatsächlich dialektisch-materialisti-
scher Entwicklung voll zur Entfaltung zu bringen.
Schüsselwörter: Dialektischer Materialismus, Praxis, Theorie, Methoden, Geschichte,
Gesellschaft
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Summary
As the editor of Mind, Culture, and Activity, the premier English-language journal
committed to the cultural-historical approach, which actually bears this commit-
ment in its name, I come to read many articles how scholars around the world
theorize their research objects and activities. Few authors in our journal, if any
in recent years, have drawn on the work of Klaus Holzkamp. In this article, I
provide an account of my personal encounters with the work of Holzkamp and
with some of the individuals who have known him or worked in his wake. I
particularly focus on the intersections that I see with the works of other scholars,
which I have known before and more extensively by the time I came to read the
Grundlegung der Psychologie. These other works constitute a mediating element
in my own reading and appreciation of Holzkamp. In contrast to others who see
a decline in Critical Psychology and the work and agenda of Klaus Holzkamp, I
believe that there remains a considerable amount of work to be done to bring his
thoughts to fruition in and through a true process of dialectical materialist deve-
lopment.
Keywords: dialectical materialism, praxis, theory, method, culture, history, society
1. Introduction
Today I am the editor of Mind, Culture, and Activity, the premier English-speaking
journal that bears key concepts from the Russian school of Marxist psychology
in its name. My arduous and thorny trajectory in coming to understand the work
of one of its key scholars, Klaus Holzkamp, in a deeper, speak dialectical way, is
intertwined with my development as a scholar. Certainly in a fitting manner, I
have come to appreciate the work of Holzkamp as I grabbled with developing
methods and theory during a project in inner-city schools in Philadelphia,
Pennsylvania, where 98% of students are African American and 90% of the stu-
dents live in families whose combined parental income lies below the poverty-line
(compared to about 12% poverty across the board and about 24% among Blacks).
Together with the students, teachers, teachers in training, administrators, and
university supervisors and professors, we attempted to find ways in which all the
stakeholders could gain greater control over their life conditions, which, as we
found out, they could get by contributing to the collective control and determi-
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nation of their situations in the school. It is after we had developed certain
emancipatory practices – to a great part geared toward dealing with the theory/re-
search-praxis gap that teachers experience in university-school transitions and
collaborations – that I happened to come across the work of Klaus Holzkamp.
His writings have inspired me ever since. Now, I am not, nor have I aspired to
be, a »student« of Klaus Holzkamp’s. I have not come through the Psychologisches
Institut at the Freie Universität (Berlin). I therefore do not claim to read his work
in any authoritative way, as some of his »real« students or interpreters might do.
The purpose of this article is to revisit my encounter with the work of
Holzkamp, its uses and difficulties of reception in the Anglo-Saxon literature.
Among a number of problems for a proper appreciation is the fact that there are
few English Holzkamp texts available so that it comes upon those reading in
German to contribute to the spreading of his approach. My version of the
Grundlegung actually is something like a »samizdat« version, which I obtained
through a network of relations in and to Germany. When the publisher Campus,
at the time of my request, no longer had copies in print and did not foresee the
production of further copies, someone quite supportive of my work had a copy
produced and bound, fittingly, in red hard cover. I continue to appreciate the
book and the work of Holzkamp generally as an inspiration for further develop-
ment of social psychology, and, though some may think Critical Psychology is
in a decline (e.g., Teo 1998), believe that there is a lot of potential that still looks
for (materialist dialectical) development.
2. Coteaching and Cogenerative Dialogue Practice: Research from
the Position of the Subject
Die Philosophen haben die Welt nur verschieden interpretiert, es kommt drauf
an, sie zu verändern. Marx & Engels 1968, 7
Even before encountering the work of Klaus Holzkamp and Critical Psycho-
logy1, I was engaged in forms of praxis that was at the heart of the person and
the movement associated with his leadership; perhaps it was my extensive
grounding in emancipatory praxis that Critical Psychology fell on fertile ground.
As a former high school teacher in the Canadian provinces of Quebec, Newfound-
land, and Ontario, transforming more so than understanding what we teachers
were doing in schools was a central aspect of my self-understanding. Later, when
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I became a university professor, I continued to work at the elbow of teachers to
produce together with them resources that allowed them to learn teaching science
and allowed their students to learn science in the process. Although I came to
Holzkamp’s work late, I have found it useful both to conceptualize the praxis-
related work we have done with inner-city schools in the attempt to assist teachers,
students, and school administrators to increase their power to act and their room
to maneuver through the gaining of greater control over their life conditions by
participating, among others, in cogenerative dialogues. We had developed two
practices to deal with expanding the room to maneuver of the agential subjects
involved: coteaching and cogenerative dialoguing.
In cogenerative dialogues (e.g., Figure 1), all stakeholders in a particular situa-
tion – which in classroom teaching include students (representatives), teachers,
new teachers (»student teachers,« »interns«), university supervisors, department
heads, (assistant) principals, and researchers – come together for the dual purpose
of (a) understanding a commonly experienced situation, for example, a science
lesson and (b) building strategies for action designed to improve aspects of their
normal collaborative and jointly-though-differently experienced praxis. The form
of joint praxis reflected upon generally is that of everyday lessons but could also
be the praxis of teaching staff dealing with administrative issues, situations in
which students may not be a part because they are, in this situation, not imme-
diate stakeholders.
An important, emancipatory aspect of this work was that we threw out of
the window the practice of triangulation common among researchers that use
qualitative-interpretive methods for collecting and analyzing data sources. Thus,
it made no longer sense to us to compare the articulated understandings of a
Black high school student with those of a white 30-year veteran university profes-
sor, even though both had participated in the same lessons. The cogenerative
dialogues were designed to expand the individual possibilities of different and
institutionally differently located stakeholders rather than to wash out and elimi-
nate their different experiences and accounts by distilling what was common
across their perspectives. But they also constituted a way of producing new
knowledge that we researchers communicated to our university-based peers.
In the course of our research, we became suspicious of researchers who claim,
from their assumed-to-be-objective positions of »fly on the wall,« to provide
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Figure 1. This video offprint shows a generative dialogue situation after a lesson
in chemistry and involves two students (#1, #3 from left), two teachers (#4, #5
from left), a supervisor (#2), and a researcher (#6, me).
ethnographically adequate accounts of classroom events specifically and across
schooling more generally. Based on my own work as a classroom teacher and my
subsequent research that I conducted by teaching together with regular classroom
teachers, I had developed coteaching. Coteaching (e.g., Figure 2) differs from
other approaches like »team teaching« in that all teaching participants – which
include regular teachers, teaching interns, teacher supervisors (administrators,
university-based intern supervisors), and researchers – are aware of and take part
in the collective responsibility. The participating teachers plan lessons together,
implement them together, and evaluate them together. Thus, rather than having
one teacher doing »one piece of the puzzle« and another a different one for the
purpose of dividing labor, all teachers take responsibility for all parts of lessons.
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This practice has shown tremendous benefits for inservice and preservice teacher
learning not only in our context but subsequently also in contexts around the
world (e.g., Roth & Tobin, 2005). Joint responsibility also meant that rather
than complaining about one thing or another not working, the teacher who notes
that the current lesson can be improved does so right here and then. I then deve-
loped a theoretical perspective that attributed primacy to praxis and how practi-
tioners perceive it.
We have made this coteaching praxis perspective the topic of reflexive con-
versations, which we subsequently came to call »cogenerative dialogues.« In these
dialogues, the previous teaching experience became the object through various
forms of objectivation. Among others, we used videotapes as a way to re-view
the events, now through the perspective of the camera lens. The images provided
a sort of touchstone, a common object that we could use as an objectively given
anchor for our personal accounts of the experienced events. As common object,
the recorded events were objectified, and with it, (aspects of) our experiences. It
was not that we considered the camera images more objective. Rather, they became
a tool in the objectification of the experience in and through our verbal accounts
of them.
Our ultimate attempt was to bring forth and about a set of resources that
would allow all participants to actively create, to a considerable extent, the con-
ditions to which they are subject to. Although this is one of the basic assumption,
a double relation (»Doppelbeziehung«), on which Holzkamp grounds his theore-
tical and his practical work, our own understanding of this relation came from
a cultural sociological position according to which each human being both (ac-
tively, creatively) produces society anew in the very same instance that he or she
reproduces aspects of this society (e.g., Sewell 1992). I had a firm desire to better
come to grips theoretically with the emancipation in and from the classrooms
and to theorize the relationship between shared praxis that realizes the societally
mediated activity (Tätigkeit, dejatel’nost’) of schooling and the shared praxis of
reflecting on the former.
Some of our early collaborators extended the emancipatory work in schools.
For example, Jennifer Beers, a teacher who had come to know cogenerative dia-
logues as a teaching intern subsequently used and developed the praxis in her
own classroom (e.g., LaVan & Beers 2005). In Jennifer’s approach to cogenera-
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Figure 2. This video offprint composite shows three teachers coteaching (far left,
far right, and center with blue shirt), myself, the fourth one, standing next to the
camera. Coteachers take part in the collective responsibility for a lesson or course
for the purpose of increasing student learning possibilities and for learning to
teach.
tive dialogue she and her students used video vignettes selected from recordings
of classroom activity to promote the emergence of cogenerated understandings
and collective responsibilities for agreed upon decisions about roles and insights
into possible ways to distribute power and accountability in the classroom. Various
members of the student research group selected video clips on the basis of their
salience to the quality of teaching and learning in the class. To assist students in
becoming critical, she taught them aspects of social analysis and social theory
including such constructs as agency, structure, resistance and social and cultural
capital. That is, she facilitated the emergence of sociological discourse that allowed
students to become critical of their own practices for the purposes of transforming
them such that they increased their action possibilities. Decisions about salience
were made in accordance with the student researchers’ understandings of social
theory and of incidents that occurred in videotape and captured the group’s at-
tention and interest.
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By the time I came to read various texts that form Klaus Holzkamp’s legacy,
in particular at some later stage the Grundlegung der Psychologie (1983b) and
Lernen: Subjektwissenschaftliche Grundlegung (1993), I had already a firm groun-
ding in practice theory through my reading of Pierre Bourdieu and Jean Lave
and in critical (Marxist) approaches to cultural phenomena that had arisen in the
British context of schooling (e.g., Valerie Walkerdine, Paul Willis). While working
on the attempt to better theorize my research in the schools, I came to re-read a
chapter by Jean Lave, the introduction to Understanding Practice: Perspectives
on Activity and Context (Chaiklin & Lave 1993). I noted the name of Klaus
Holzkamp in the references; the next chapter I read was that by Ole Dreier, and
again, Holzkamp was referenced repeatedly. As I did not know then about this
scholar, I began to search on the Internet, and the first text I came across was
»Der Mensch als Subjekt wissenschaftlicher Methodik« (Holzkamp 1983a).
3. Initial Reception
At the time I first encountered activity theory generally and Klaus Holzkamp’s
work more specifically I was not trained to think and research in a dialectical
manner. But over the course of nearly a decade, I have learned to think dialecti-
cally in and through my encounters with Aleksei Nikolaevich Leont’ev, Klaus
Holzkamp, Lev Semenovich Vygotsky, Evald Il’enkov, Mikhail Bakhtin, and
Felix Mikhailov. Initially I was a naïve reader, as any non-dialectically trained
Anglo-Saxon scholar, possibly reproducing readings that other Western researchers
might realize when they first encounter dialectical materialism. As I understand
it today, in the process of such reading the original is transformed to such an ex-
tent that it becomes unrecognizable. But, this too Holzkamp would have appre-
ciated: How other than with our naïve readings can we begin to embark on a
trajectory that leads to more mature understanding of a dialectical, critical psy-
chology? Any historical method of studying learning has to grabble with the fact
that my current understanding may and often is the antithesis of what I am to
learn, for example, when students of science come to schools with ways of seeing
the world that are inconsistent with the scientific canon that they are to acquire.
(In technical terminology, these prior understandings are referred to as »miscon-
ceptions,« »alternative frameworks,« or »naïve understandings.«) Only a historical
account of how someone comes to eventually appreciate works such as that of
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A. N. Leont’ev or Holzkamp allows us to understand the (social, psychological)
difficulties of self-transformation that occur when we expand from reading in
commonsensical ways to reading in the ways of mature practitioners.
I first read Holzkamp and the works of some of his collaborators (Morus
Markard, Ole Dreier) during the summer of 2000 while working on a series of
journal articles and on a book about our research on and experiences of coteaching
and cogenerative dialoguing in the inner-city schools and neighborhoods of
Philadelphia. (For a white person, it is imprudent to walk at night in the areas
where we worked during the day; and even during the day we walked some of
the areas only when we were together with others.) The following set of entries
in my research journal shows how my reading of Holzkamp and my thinking
about the school situation came to be intertwined:
»Unity of Praxis and LearningHolzkamp (1983a) argues that the irreducible
uniqueness of the individual has to be accounted for in general models. The
basic question on the specific level is to realize a specific praxis in the inves-
tigative process, out of which it is simultaneously possible to capture under
which conditions extension of action potential is made possible. That is,
these conditions for the extension of action potential are to be understood
out of praxis itself, under inclusion of the researcher, the inclusion of the
particular researcher »me.« What is important is that each individual is not
just a »me« but that it also understands that all each Other who shares the
situation is also a »me« who stands in a particular relation to me. This rela-
tion, which, in fact, constitutes an intersubjective framework, must not be
left out in the research process.« … Because we are involved in praxis, we
experience the conditions that enable praxis. The question now is how we
understand praxis, not in terms of immediate experience (understanding)
but in a generalized form. This involves a dialectic of understanding and
explanation, the former, experienced in praxis, but constituting the basis
for the latter. But only explanation, hermeneutic and critical analysis that
wrestles with the pre-constructed that surrounds us, can develop understan-
ding beyond the immediate situation and thereby lead to an increase in the
possibilities for action. (June 13 2000; file: Notes 102)
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Looking back at these first notes concerning Holzkamp in my research, it is no
longer clear to me whether some paragraphs are commentaries on Holzkamp or
reflections on the ongoing work in the schools, where we were concerned with
praxis and with changing praxis out of the praxis itself. It is clear that I read
Holzkamp’s (1983a) commentaries about method in a very personal way, concer-
ned with the objectification of experiences in and through the conversations with
others for whom the control over their own life conditions was the primary mo-
tive for participating – not unlike Holzkamp’s account of the praxis of women
affected by violence, the object of which was to gain greater independence.
Throughout his paper, Holzkamp was arguing for a unity of praxis and learning,
a form of exemplary praxis that leads to the evolution of knowledge precisely
because it is real concrete praxis. Jean Lave (1993) later introduced this idea to
English-speaking audiences, when she wrote that the nature of knowledge is
problematical, not that of learning, which inevitably occurs in and through praxis.
(Following Anglo-Saxon customs, she actually wrote »practice,« which, because
it refers to patterned actions and therefore to an abstraction rather than the soli-
citude of concrete action [praxis] leads to a different appreciation of where and
how learning occurs.)
During that same summer of 2000 I also read extensively the work of Yrjö
Engeström; his work, too, entered the conceptualizations of the articles and book
that I conceived during that period. Through both Holzkamp and Engeström I
came to know about their intellectual heritage and forefather: A. N. Leont’ev. I
was not, however, in a position to appreciate the differences in the work of
Holzkamp and Engeström other than that the former appeared to focus on the
subject of experience making conscious and grounded (»begründete«) decisions
about next actions rather than being merely subject to extant conditions, whereas
the latter focused on the objective structures of activity systems. It became clear
to me only years later that if anyone it was Holzkamp who reproduced and deve-
loped the method that Leont’ev had articulated, outlined, and created in germinal
form. That is, Holzkamp and his colleagues within the Berlin Critical Psychology
group further developed the materialist dialectical development of method and
topic that Leont’ev had seeded.
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4. Relation to the Work of Others
4.1 Establishing a Critical Science
When I read my first Holzkamp texts, I did not come tabula rasa. I had al-
ready conducted research for years and, among others, had developed tremendous
depth in a range of theoretical approaches, including Piagetian and neo-Piagetian
theory, cognitive psychology, social constructivism, (cognitive) phenomenology,
ethnomethodology and conversation analysis, and discursive psychology. Such
prior experiences, as I point out above, must be thought of as the necessary ground
on which my reading occurred and the resource for evolving new understandings.
As I read, I immediately realized that some of the things we find in Holzkamp
could also be found in the works of others, with more or less family resemblance.
I am not a purist who feels that he has to hold up the canon. Grundlegung is not
and never has been something like the Bible for orthodox Christians of all brands
– the evangelical movements in the US being much more orthodox than Catholics
and Russian Orthodox.
But because I do not consider myself to be a Holzkamp exegete, a »true«
follower, or a »true« Critical Psychologist, I can read the works of other scholars
with an open mind and understand and appreciate the similarities, for example,
between Holzkamp and the Canadian (Marxist) sociologist Dorothy E. Smith
or Holzkamp and the French dialectical hermeneutic philosopher Paul Ricœur.
What I have always been interested in is the development of ideas so that they
are helpful in reflecting on and developing praxis rather than in developing an
intellectual school that is more concerned with the purity of its lineage than with
doing real work, for real people, assisting them in getting a better handle on their
situation and, in so doing, emancipate themselves (a bit) from rather oppressive
situations. In the pursuit of the object that I construct, deconstruct, and recon-
struct, I adapt the method to make it suitable to the object rather than the other
way around – which would be the Procrustean way of persons treating the whole
world as a nail because the only tool they have is a hammer.
For me one of the interesting aspects of Holzkamp’s approach is his catego-
rical reconstruction of psychological concepts. In his own »Erfahrungsbericht«
(1983a), he writes about how he realized that what happens in psychological ex-
periments is independent of the concepts used. These experiments do not have
what it takes to test the concepts themselves; and they have even less of what it
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takes to deconstruct the concepts experimentally. And then Holzkamp asks an
important question that goes something like this: »Where do these concepts come
from and where/when do they get their scientific pertinence?«
In this first Holzkamp text that I read, I immediately noted the parallel in
this respect with the reflexive sociology of Pierre Bourdieu (1992), who notes
that the preconstructed concepts are everywhere so that the sociologist often finds
precisely what he presupposes to be the case. Thus,
»the construction of a scientific object requires first and foremost a break
with common sense, that is, with the representations shared by all, whether
they be the mere commonplaces of ordinary existence or official representa-
tions, often inscribed in institutions and thus present both in the objectivity
of social organizations and in the minds of participants.« (p. 235)
Bourdieu proposes the practice of radical doubt, which parallels the »suspicion
of ideology« (»Ideologieverdacht«) that critical psychologists are asked to enact
(Markard 1993). Already in Bourdieu, we find the assertion that if we leave our
thought in a state of the unthought, as an ideology, we condemn ourselves to be
nothing more than an instrument of that which we claim to think, which is, the
ruling relations that Dorothy Smith writes about in all of her works. Consistent
with the Holzkampian critique of traditional psychology (»Variablenpsychologie«),
which never interrogates the concepts that it generally has inherited from everyday
discourses, Bourdieu critiques »scientific practice that fails to question itself,«
which, as he asserts, »does not, properly speaking, know what it does« (p. 236).
Such a science reveals something in the object that is not really objectivated since
the object consists in and of the very principles of the apprehension of the object.
Such a science can only be part scholarly in that it
»borrows its problems, its concepts, and its instruments of knowledge from the
social world, and that it often records as a datum, as an empirical given independent
of the act of knowledge and of the science which performs it, facts, representations
or institutions which are the product of a prior stage of science. In short, it records
itself without recognizing itself . . . « (p. 236).
Thus, as for Holzkamp (1983a), real science begins with the testing of the
ensemble of fundamental assumptions that are made in adopting particular
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(theoretical) concepts. Bourdieu recommends a historical approach, which begins
by retracing the history of the emergence of the problems one chooses to study,
its progressive constitution in and through the ruling relations, by »the collective
work, oftentimes accomplished through competition and struggle, that proved
necessary to make such and such issues to be known and recognized« (p. 238).
Language is a repository of naturalized, black-boxed, and calcified precon-
structions that are ignored as such and that function as unconscious instruments
of construction and domination; it constitutes the medium of ideology as such
(Bakhtine [Volochinov] 1977). Examples of instruments of construction and
domination are bureaucratic conceptualizations, including all sorts of taxonomies.
Among these taxonomies are those, as the Canadian feminist Marxist sociologist
Dorothy E. Smith (e.g. 1990) points out, of the »standard North American family«
or »single parent family« that have equal currency among policy makers, sociolo-
gists, school practitioners, and even those affected in the final end, the real, con-
crete everyday people raising kids. The way these concepts work is this: they
produce articulations that bring together »objectified and universalized systems
of administration and the actualities always local, always particular, always indi-
vidual, and inexhaustibly various« (p. 144). As an example, Smith uses the way
in which self-inflicted death (suicide) is talked about. Thus, the expression »she
killed herself« does not necessarily commit us to a language that speaks from a
particular position – i.e., which comes with particular prepositions, suppositions,
presuppositions, dispositions, and so on and therefore defines a particular subjec-
tivity. The expression »she committed suicide« is an institutionalized factual
statement provided by and within a complex apparatus of surveying, governing,
administering, and managing. By taking on and employing such concepts and
discourses, those affected contribute to the reproduction of the concepts and
discourses, which therefore constitute a form of ideology that any emancipatory
project has to tackle through ideological critique. If a woman describes and un-
derstands herself by means of the term »single parent,« she subscribes to and re-
produces this category, which may not always be a blessing for her. Similarly to
the self-critical stances that Bourdieu and Smith take with respect to sociology,
Holzkamp’s work concerned the ideological critique within, and of, the discipline
of psychology.
13Journal für Psychologie, Jg. 16(2008), Ausgabe 2
Consistent with Holzkamp’s own intentions, Smith develops – in Institutio-
nal Ethnography (2005) particularly – a method that bears great family resemblance
with the approach Holzkamp has advocated and developed over the years. Smith
is concerned with the way the social is actually experienced, by real people, enga-
ged, for example, in the real work of waiting in a nursing home. She is concerned
with the everyday world, the lifeworld of people, and how they use any available
resources in their everyday praxis of coping. But
«[t]he actualities of the everyday world don’t tell you what to observe and
record. In addition to its problematic, it needs theoretical specification to guide
the direction of the ethnographer’s gaze. I’ve called that theoretical specification
an ontology because I want to emphasize that what we are aiming to discover really
happens or is happening.« (p. 209, original emphasis)
This ontology »starts from Marx and Engels’s ontology of a social science
that sets aside concepts, speculation, and imagination in favor of engaging with
actual people’s actual activities« (p. 209). This »setting aside« of concepts is also
at heart of Holzkamp’s attempt to do a categorical analysis of the human psyche.
He points out that research never can stay with a mere articulation of subjective
experiences in the way he sees the phenomenological project. Rather, and consis-
tent with Smith, he seeks to derive the concrete realization of subjective experience
as mediated by societal processes, where the relationship between individual and
collective is understood as one of general collective possibilities that are concretely
realized (and therefore singularized) in concrete and founded behaviors. In this
way, both scholars allow us to understand what we have practiced in cogenerative
dialoguing, acknowledging and using the different perspectives that arose from
our different institutional locations without attributing primacy to any one per-
spective. But rather than falling into the trap of mystifying »bourgeois« concepts
as he sees them in ethnomethodology or symbolic interactionism (Holzkamp
1984), Smith advocates lifeworld analyses – sometimes in the form of conversa-
tion analytic and ethnomethodological studies – combined with the critical
(Marxist) analysis of the determinations that are inaccessible to the actors them-
selves. Any science of the subject has to begin with the lifeworld, which provides
the ground (»Grund«) and the grounds (»Begründungen«) for the action of the
subject.
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The interesting aspect of Smith’s work is constituted by the intersections
with the project engaged by Holzkamp and Critical Psychology. Thus, she pro-
motes institutional ethnography as a method that has a lot in common with Sub-
jektwissenschaft. These intersections arise from her concerns for both the lived
realities of people – such as a mother who raises her children on her own – and
the institutional discourses that they come to be caught up in that they in fact
contribute to reifying. The concept of »single mom« not only is a category for
the (sociological) classification of the family but also is a resource that leads to
particular actions within schools, for example, special services, treatments, and
considerations for the children. Smith emphasizes in particular the standpoint
of women, who »are always located in particular, actual places, knowing the so-
ciety only from within« (p. 33). This is precisely the position of the subject that
becomes the participant in the research. Smith’s institutional ethnography, which
explicitly takes the standpoint of the people for whom the research is done, the-
refore is consistent, in my reading, with Subjektwissenschaft. At the same time,
as Holzkamp points out in various places, the life conditions cannot be changed
from within as long as the determinations that are imported into the lifeworld,
for example in the form of discourses and concepts, remain unknown. Only a
critical institutional analysis of the ruling relations, necessarily a historical analysis,
will lead to an understanding of the subjects’ present situation in a cultural-his-
torical and societal context. Readers may be familiar with Holzkamp’s (1983a)
story of the father and son, beating up on each other when the latter drops out
of school, coming to understand and change their situation only after they come
to understand the source of their problem in the exploitative relation at the father’s
work and the objectifications of their own mutual relation. 4.2 Critical Psycho-
logy as a First Psychology/Philosophy?
The ten thousand things are born of being. Being is born of not being. 40
Tao Te Ching
How did humankind develop to the point that it could reflexively look at
itself and do anything like philosophy, psychology, or sociology? How did humans
come to think of Being as something that constitutes beings (»Seiendes,« »the
ten thousand things«) when clearly before anthropogenesis they did not have the
capacity to think such thoughts?2 Even though Holzkamp and Holzkampians
might reject phenomenology as having some shared concerns3, there are numerous
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parallels in the projects of phenomenology and Critical Psychology. Let me arti-
culate a few. First, there is a critique of operating with concepts that have not
themselves been questioned. Thus, Martin Heidegger (1977) himself articulated
the possibilities and dangers that come with original and originary, praxis-based
understanding and the existential pre-structure of Being. In the circle (»Zirkel«
not »Kreis«) of understanding
»verbirgt sich eine positive Möglichkeit ursprünglichsten Erkennens, die
freilich in echter Weise nur dann ergriffen ist, wenn die Auslegung verstanden
hat, daß ihre erste, ständige und letzte Aufgabe bleibt, sich jeweils Vorhabe,
Vorsicht und Vorgriff nicht durch Einfälle und Volksbegriffe vorgeben zu lassen,
sondern in deren Ausarbeitung aus den Sachen selbst her das wissenschaftliche
Thema zu sichern.« (p. 153)
In the same way as the philosopher, Holzkamp does not want to operate
with concepts that are outside the scientific program, that come from somewhere,
taken on from somewhere, or are the result of one’s cogitations (»außerhalb des
wissenschaftlichen Programms, die kommen irgendwo her, die hat man übernom-
men, sich selber ausgedacht oder so,« Holzkamp 1983a). It comes as little surprise,
therefore, if radical doubt is also a theme that we find in critical hermeneutics
(Ricœur 1986), which, though it may speak from a different place than the criti-
que of ideology, raises a legitimate claim that bears family resemblance with the
latter: »interest for emancipation leads back to the ninth [sic] thesis on Feuerbach:
‘Philosophers interpreted the world; the point now is to change it.’ An eschatology
of non-violence thereby constitutes the ultimate philosophical horizon of a critique
of ideology« (p. 399, my translation). For Ricœur, it is only insofar as I place
myself in the other’s point of view that I can come to confront myself, in and as
of objectified being, with my present interpretive horizon and with my prejudices.
And, in the same way as Critical Psychology, critical hermeneutics is dialectical
and materialist, or so I have read and interpreted Ricœur’s work.
Second, Holzkamp defines his approach as one that develops a method for
testing the scientific soundness of logical fundamental concepts (»wissenschaftliche
Tragfähigkeit logischer Grundbegriffe«), which he denotes by the term »categories«
(Kategorien). This method does not have an equivalent in traditional psychology,
though it has equivalents in other critical sciences. I see in this attempt of
grounding concepts categorically an effort similar to the one oriented toward
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establishing a first philosophy, that is, of establishing the grounds on which any-
thing like discoursing, culture, reflection, philosophy, and so forth could have
established itself in concrete practice. Correspondingly, at issue for Holzkamp is
the attempt of the scientific construction of a new set of fundamental psycholo-
gical concepts on a paradigmatic level (»Versuch auf einer paradigmatischen
Ebene eine neue Sorte von psychologischen Grundbegriffen wissenschaftlich
abzuleiten«). We cannot do philosophy unless the very ground of philosophizing,
the use of words, the experience of others and self, and the role of the primacy
of praxis in human understanding have been established. We cannot do psycho-
logy or sociology critically unless we work with scientifically established categories
rather than with concepts that constitute a form of reified common sense and
ideology. Among the notable philosophers attempting to reconstruct philosophy
on categorical grounds are Emmanuel Levinas (e.g. 1978) and Jean-Luc Nancy
(e.g. 1993). Thus, prior to any conceptualization, prior to any Being or beings
recognized as such, there have been the utterly practical – that is, prior to all
thematization – experiences of touch, proximity, sexuality, reciprocity, and with
that constituted the unthematized foundation of anthropomorphosis.
As for Levinas and his attempt to establish a first philosophy, the following
quote captures its essence. Levinas summarizes his project as one that attempts
to
»recognize in subjectivity an ex-ception that puts out of order the conjunc-
tion of essence, being, and ‘difference’; to perceive in the substantiality of the
subject, in the hard nucleus of the ‘unique’ within me, in my unparalleled iden-
tity, the substitution of the other; to think this abnegation, before any will, as an
exposition, merciless, to the trauma of transcendence according to a susception
more – and otherwise – passive than receptivity, passion, and finitude; to derive
from this nonassumable susceptibility the praxis and the knowledge internal to
the world.« (Levinas 1978, 10, my translation)
Levinas, as Holzkamp, does not want to begin theorizing without interroga-
ting the concept of Being, simply presupposing it and its knowledge. He wants
to begin prior to and beyond Being and essences. Similarly, only a psychology
that theorizes the emergence of culture and consciousness and that has the means
to theorize itself and its praxis through a reflexive turn is a real science. I see the
Grundlegung as an attempt to show precisely how evolution brings a species to a
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point that it, in a qualitative step leading to consciousness and therefore self-
consciousness, becomes subject to a very different change process, one subject to
the laws of culture and history. Phenomenological philosophers only begin at
that point where consciousness is or has been emerging; they do so but only in
general terms rather than in the terms of a dialectical materialist science. Holz-
kamp wants to go further back, tracking the psyche and its predecessors back to
their evolutionary beginnings. Thus, whereas in first philosophy we find the
nonthematized experiences of proximity, touch, the face, the undifferentiated
with, all of which we can associate with the ground upon which anthropogenesis
occurred, it is Holzkamp who concretizes the means and processes by which so-
mething like a primate eventually could become human. His five-step process –
in which quantitative changes in the individual and environment lead to the
emergence of new, qualitatively different functions and structures – is consistent
with a catastrophe-theory-based, morphogenetic account of the evolution of
structure and functions (e.g. Thom 1981).
Nevertheless, phenomenological philosophers do attempt to wrestle with
the conditions prior to Being. In a manner that has had its springboard in mate-
rialist dialectical way of thinking, the beginning is set prior to the »you« and
»me,« prior to the experience of »self« in the form of a »we« that is neither inter-
subjectivity nor collective subject but rather an immediate mediation of the with,
a plural fold of the origin (Nancy 2000). But Jean-Luc Nancy goes further by
disallowing even the dialectical as a starting point: »Being is directly and imme-
diately mediated by itself; it is itself mediation; it is mediation without any instru-
ment, and it is nondialectic: dia-lectic without dialectic It is negativity without
use, the nothing of the with and the nothing as the with« (p. 94). »Before all re-
presentational grasp there is the experience, before consciousness and its subject,
before science, and theology, and philosophy, there is that: the that of, precisely,
there is« (Nancy 1993, 4)
As the phenomenological philosophers, Holzkamp engages in the reconstruc-
tion of the human psyche that begins prior to any form of consciousness and
experience. His approach is characterized by the attempt to begin with an objec-
tive definition originary form of the psyche (»Grundform des Psychischen«) that
does not presuppose consciousness. Drawing on and elaborating a dialectical ma-
terialist method, Holzkamp constructs a possible trajectory from some originary
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»sensibility,« an idea that he has taken from Leont’ev, to the emergence of coope-
ration, culture, mind, activity, and consciousness. We see here the family resem-
blances in the attempts emerging from phenomenological philosophy in establis-
hing a first philosophy, on the one side, and Holzkamp in his attempt to build
the true foundations of any psychology, a Grundlegung der Psychologie, on the
other side. Consistent with the critical (Marxist) method, the specifically human
end form has to be a specific realization of the possibilities embodied in the initial,
originary form.
In summary, then, in my reading of the available texts these phenomenolo-
gical studies pursue precisely the same agenda that I read Holzkamp as having
pursued. For example, during a discussion with others concerning the function
of phenomenological analyses in psychology, Holzkamp (1985) noted:
»Gestern wurde dargestellt: Intentionalität, Situiertheit des Menschen, Re-
ziprozität der Perspektiven, Perspektivität usw. All dies ist für mich eine Art von
strukturellen Grundbestimmungen menschlicher Erfahrung, und wenn ich jetzt
Psychologie mache, kann ich dahinter nicht zurück: Zwar ist das nicht alles, was
ich mache, sondern ich fange jetzt mit meinen inhaltlichen Analysen erst an, aber
es darf am Ende nichts rauskommen, was hinter das zurückfällt, was in diesen
Bestimmungen drin ist. Wenn ich anfange mit meinen logisch-historischen
Analysen und am Ende kommt irgend was raus, bei dem das Moment der Rezi-
prozität der Perspektiven rausgefallen ist, ist meine Analyse Mist, und zwar des-
wegen, weil sie nicht mehr von dem spricht, von dem sie zu reden behauptet.«
(pp. 149–150)
A first philosophy attempts to ground the subject matter such that none of
the specifically human experiences, such as Being (»Sein,« »Être«) and beings
(»Seiendes,« »étant«), can be taken as the starting point precisely because, as
Holzkamp notes, the analyses cannot go further backward to interrogate these
starting points.
5. Reading Holzkamp
Reading Holzkamp is difficult, even, as I found out from my colleagues, for
many Germans and German colleagues next to impossible. Reading Holzkamp
and, more so, understanding him and his thought becomes near impossible in
the few translations that I have found and read (e.g., Holzkamp 1991a, 1991b).
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Now Holzkamp himself knew about the difficulties that his Grundlegung posed,
for in this preface in the first publication he notes »Man wird mir sagen, es mache
große Mühe, dieses Buch zu lesen. Ich halte dem entgegen, daß es auch Mühe
gemacht hat, es zu schreiben. Ich würde diese Arbeit nicht der Öffentlichkeit
vorlegen, wenn ich nicht der Überzeugung wäre, daß sich deren Lektüre lohnt«
(p. 21). There is quite a bit of hubris here, one that may be characteristic of the
German academic context that is very different than my North American one.
In fact, most research journals in psychology, education, sociology, and other
disciplines will return manuscripts for major revisions or outright reject them
because they use »arcane« language and »jargon« as soon as the reading levels
(e.g., Flesch Kincade) go beyond grade 12.
Here, too, there are parallels between Holzkamp and Heidegger: the language
of both is considered to be arcane, both in their originals and in those cases
where other scholars adopt the language of either for their own purposes (to
borrow an expression by Mikhail Bakhtin). I have repeatedly had this experience
when attempting to theorize what I was doing in the terms of phenomenology
or Critical Psychology. I do not agree with the reviewer practice of avoiding en-
gagement by drawing on the »arcane language« and »jargon« weapons (i.e., rejec-
ting an article because it uses or develops unfamiliar terms); but I do believe that
our scholarly discourses need to be suitable to efficiently communicate. All disci-
plines develop their discourses and it does not make sense to charge psychologists,
sociologists, or educators for using language in the same way that it does not
make sense to accuse car mechanics or electricians to use jargon. From a dialectical
materialist perspective, the word addresses itself to an interlocutor and is a func-
tion of the person of the interlocutor. There word therefore changes depending
on the societal, hierarchical, institutional positions and relations of the author
and audience (Bakhtine [Volochinov] 1977). From the very perspective he adopts,
Holzkamp therefore is required to take into account the generalized other, who
will »countersign« his texts in and through reading.
Holzkamp therefore bears responsibility for and to his audience, and the
responsibility to communicate in ways that his ideas can be reproduced at a much
larger scale than it does. This is particularly the case with the translations of some
of his terms into English, which make little sense and are impossible to understand
and adopt. One example is the rendering of »Handlungsfähigkeit« as action potence.
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The term »potence« is elaborated in dictionaries by the terms power, ability, and
strength. Whereas it is correct to render »Fähigkeit« by the term »ability,« and
therefore »potence,« the term ordinarily is used to refer to sexual prowess. Like-
wise, the term is awkward, old-fashioned, and may be experienced even as revul-
sive. When I talked with Charles Tolman about the choice of the term, who both
wrote a book about Critical Psychology (Tolman 1994) and co-edited, with
Wolfgang Maiers a volume on the topic (Tolman & Maiers 1991), he told me
»Klaus wanted it like that« and that Holzkamp did not give in to suggestions for
another term.
Just to develop this point a little further. There is precedence for other,
equivalent but less cumbersome terms, such as the French »pouvoir d’agir«
(Ricœur 1990), which is generally translated into English as »power to act.« Not
only have we used this term in our work, and feel it constitutes a suitable rendering
of »Handlungsfähigkeit,« but also the term resonates with the term power, which
is crucial in understanding Foucault cited in Lernen, and empowerment. Expan-
ding one’s power to act appears to me precisely the expansive learning (»expansives
Lernen«) that is at the heart of Holzkamp’s own agenda in his critique of tradi-
tional conceptions of theories of learning and teaching. Expansive learning incre-
ases a person’s room to maneuver, Spielraum, a term that we found useful in the
theorization of learning to teach (e.g. Roth et al. 2001).
Having done a lot of research and published many research articles and
books over the past 20 years, I have come to realize that it is not just about
»communicating my ideas.« Publishing is about writing for the audience about
something of interest to the audience using a language that has come from the
other and, through my writing, returns to the other. If all I have is something of
singular relevance to me, why should it be of interest to others? »How can I,«
Holzkamp should have perhaps asked, »assist readers to read my discourse if they
are fluent only in a very different language?« Communication between people
who speak different languages means that the participants in the conversation
find and build some third language – Sabir, as I repeatedly called it borrowing
the name normally used to denote the hybrid language of Mediterranean mer-
chants – that allows intelligible expression and mutual understanding. Therefore,
as any reading and writing theorist knows, communication cannot be thought
from the perspective of one actor but only from the perspective of the dialectical
21Journal für Psychologie, Jg. 16(2008), Ausgabe 2
author–reader pair. In the postmodern literature, this thematic has been elaborated
most importantly by the exchange that John Searle had with Jacques Derrida
(1988) who, in his Limited Inc, clearly shows that every signed text has to be
countersigned by the reader. Without the countersignature, it makes little sense
to speak of the written oeuvres at all.
Given the possible inflexibility with which Holzkamp approached writing
and communication with his audiences, I am therefore not surprised by the reac-
tions of my collaborators and colleagues who do not and cannot appreciate even
the grosser (coarser) points that Holzkamp makes. All of this, of course, is made
even more difficult by his dialectical approach, which is not even understood as
such. Again, the misappropriation and lack of appreciation of dialectical writing
is not a surprise to me, as I can see in the way most North American scholars
read Lev Semenovich Vygotsky and his successor Aleksei Nikolayevich Leont’ev.
Other useful authors that would allow a better appreciation of Holzkamp’s work
and the one of Leont’ev on which he built would be that of the Russian philoso-
pher Evald Il’enkov, who marvelously explicates the dialectical materialist method
that underlies Karl Marx’s Das Kapital and the development of the human psyche
in Grundlegung.
6. Aleksei N. Leont’ev and Holzkamp
Leont’ev’s work has come to be known to a larger number of Western scholars
concerned with activity theory through the publications of Yrjö Engeström,
mostly through a WORD manuscript version of his dissertation Learning by Ex-
panding (1987). Although this original starting point still bears all the marks of
the Marxist heritage of Leont’ev’s work, subsequent chapters and articles hardly
at all make reference to this Marxist origin, which, to me, has to do with the re-
lationship of U.S. culture and Marxism. Other scholars, such as Jean Lave, have
told me about the difficulties they have had with the culture; and Jean’s preference
is to spend months at a time in Denmark, where she finds the intellectual climate
much more productive than in her home country. Also, Engeström is mostly re-
produced in and through a triangular representation that he had chosen for de-
picting the mediational relation within the unit of human activity. This triangle
is structural and the dynamic dimensions have gotten lost in most research that
references Engeström.
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In my reading, Holzkamp much more so than Engeström reproduces and
extends the agenda that Leont’ev originally outlined. In fact, Holzkamp explicitly
grounds his starting point in Leont’ev, to whom he has dedicated the Grundlegung:
»Da wir uns hinsichtlich der Bestimmung der Grundform des Psychischen auf
A.N. Leontjew beziehen, brauchen wir die genannte Ausgangsabstraktion hier
nicht selbst zu realisieren, sondern können das Resultat seiner Abstraktionsvoll-
züge übernehmen« (p. 67). That is, Holzkamp does not entirely go back to the
drawing board in his reconstruction of the human psyche, but takes Leont’ev’s
accomplishments as his starting point. But he also highlights the fact that although
he takes the definitions of the fundamental determinations of the psyche, he does
not take on board with it the empirical-historical analyses concerning the origin
and differentiation of the psyche.
This extension of Leont’ev’s program also occurs at the level of method.
Thus, the transition between qualitatively different levels and the dependence
on earlier quantitative changes at the lower level is explicitly foreshadowed when
Leont’ev (1978) conceptualizes interlevel relations, »which consists of the fact
that the available higher level always becomes dominant, but it cannot be realized
except with the help of the lower-lying levels and is thus dependent on them« (p. 142,
original emphasis). The real object of studying interlevel relations are the »multi-
faceted forms of these realizations due to which the processes of the higher level
are not only concretized but also individualized« (p. 142). Studying interlevel
relations becomes central in and to the Grundlegung: »Der qualitative Übergang
zur »psychischen« Stufe war nur dadurch (im Rahmen des Möglichen) empirisch
zu rekonstruieren, daß dabei verschiedene Zwischenstufen, in denen der Übergang
sich vollzog, begrifflich herausgehoben wurden« (p. 78). Holzkamp takes this as
his starting point to develop a general, dialectical method to articulate the emer-
gence of new qualities in the phylogeny of the psyche. There are five steps that
need to be articulated and explicated, which together embody the program outli-
ned in Leont’ev: (a) the real-historical dimensions of the earlier level; (b) the ob-
jective environmental changes that bring about an inner contradiction; (c) the
first qualitative changes of function in the relevant dimensions on the to (a) cor-
responding side of the organism; (d) the second qualitative changes of dominance
between the previously major function and the new major function; and (e) the
restructuring of the developmental trajectory of the entire system after the quali-
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tatively specific form has become the dominant one. Here, though (and because)
»dialectically negated,« the earlier functions constitute – as Leont’ev predicted –
the very conditions of the qualitative change in functions. In emphasizing the
organism pole in the third step, I understand Holzkamp to realize Leont’ev’s re-
quirement for method to show how processes are both concretized and ultimately
individualized.
Interestingly, Holzkamp provides us with a way of understanding the pro-
blems many Westerners have in understanding the evolution of species, which
»suddenly« appear to take on new properties that are said, in Darwinian fashion,
to provide answers to changes and pressures in the environment. In Holzkamp,
these answers exist already as possibilities in search of problems; they become
dominant precisely when changes in conditions occur. This then leads to the fact
that species are not only adapted to the present but that they already have the
potential to be adapted to new challenges, and the relevant functions come to
express themselves in an as-needed and just-in-time fashion.
7. Personal Encounters
Over the years, I had found Holzkamp’s work salient to my own and I have ac-
quired all the texts accessible from afar. In addition to the books that I brought
back from Germany, I was able to find online those texts from his work that
were published through the critical psychology website. During these years I also
met and newly encountered a number of individuals who had worked with
Holzkamp or used his work to direct their own. I already had known Jean Lave,
but she never really talked about her encounters with Holzkamp. I understood
later that the two have had considerable mutual influence on each other’s work,
which, for Holzkamp, can be seen in the references to her in Learning and in his
critique of schooling. In Jean’s work, the references to the people she has read
and encountered frequently are more muted, as I know from the way in which
she has transformed her obvious knowledge and understanding of Pierre Bourdieu.
Shortly after coming to know about Critical Psychology, I found out that
the author of Psychology, Society, and Subjectivity, Charles Tolman, had been a
faculty member in the psychology department at my university. He was already
retired but held a visiting professor emeritus position in the Centre for Studies of
Religion and Society. I emailed him and we agreed to meet. During this meeting
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he talked a lot about how he had gone to Germany in the 1970s and, while there,
how he met »Klaus«; he then talked about their long-standing relationship that
lasted until the untimely death of Holzkamp. Charles also agreed to give a talk
in one of my seminars, which turned out to be »On Doing Psychological Research
from the Standpoint of the Subject.« Interestingly enough, the paper he presented,
here as in other iterations at my university, did not make reference to Holzkamp
at all but provided a historical analysis of the subject as the subject matter of
psychology. Fully consistent with Holzkamp, he argued for a psychology that
takes the standpoint of the subject – which, as I found out later, Dorothy Smith
(who also had taught at my university in the 1970s and now teaches again as
professor emerita) has made the central aspect of her research – rather than the
standpoint of the researcher.
One day in March of 2002, I came to meet Thomas Teo – who had spent
a postdoctoral period at the Freie Universität – during the meeting of the peer
committees that make decisions about the funding of Canadian research. We
were on different committees, he on the one in psychology, where he represented
qualitative and historical psychology; I was chairing the committee for educational
psychology and learning in the disciplines. I had received and read my copies of
Grundlegung and Lernen and was both an avid reader of the work and eager to
talk to others about it. When I met Thomas, I thought there was a good oppor-
tunity to talk about Critical Psychology, because there are few if any individuals
in my immediate working context who know the writings of Holzkamp. But as
far as I recollect, Thomas Teo had a more muted attitude and did not appear to
foresee much of a future for the movement. Only much later did I come to read
his analysis »Klaus Holzkamp and the Rise and Decline of German Critical Psy-
chology« (Teo 1998), where he recognized several periods, a critical emancipatory
period from 1968 to 1972, a critical conceptual period that lasted to the year in
which the Grundlegung appeared, a subject scientific period until his death in
1995. Thomas attributed the decline of critical psychology to social developments
and limitations in the foundational framework, and to the rise of other critical
approaches.
The one person I really came to work with on and around the ideas of
Holzkamp was Ines Langemeyer, who had done her doctoral dissertation on
contradictions in expansive learning. I came to know her initially when she inter-
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viewed for a postdoctoral position in a research center for which I had received
funding. Then we met in person at the 2005 meeting of the International Society
for Cultural and Activity Research, where she attended a session in which I was a
participant. Having re-read extensively the foundations of activity theory, I had
realized that there were many places in which Engeström’s writing and public
talks exhibited logical rather than inner contradictions. For example, on the
website of the Center for Activity and Work Research in Helsinki, Finland, activity
was suggested to be the minimal unit of analysis; and then on the same site, various
moments of the activity system – subject, tools, object, division of labor, rules,
and community – were denoted by the term »element.« Now, already Vygotsky
(1986) had suggested moving from an analysis in terms of elements to an analysis
in terms of units that retain the phenomenon as a whole; Leont’ev continued
this approach and postulated collective activity (Tätigkeit) as this unit. Attempting
to analyze activity in terms of subjects, objects, and tools as its elements appeared
to me quite contradictory. After the session, Ines came to see me asking whether
I had read some paper of hers, that my critique of the way in which Engeström
presented cultural-historical activity theory was precisely what she had been
working on. So we decided to co-author a piece that would take a critical, Holz-
kampian perspective on Engeström (Langemeyer & Roth 2006). Our main
concern were the logical contradictions that came to be perpetuated by other
Western scholars who completely neglect the fundamental commitment of
Leont’ev (as that of Holzkamp) to a Marx, Engels, and Lenin. Holzkamp himself
had pointed out this misrepresentation in his introduction to Tätigkeit, Bewußt-
sein, Persönlichkeit (Leontjew 1982):
„. . . wird in dem vorliegenden Buch noch deutlicher als in der früheren
Arbeit, daß die marxistische Fundierung von Leontjews psychologischer
Konzeption nicht – wie von bürgerlicher Seite immer wieder unterstellt –
lediglich ein äußerliches Lippenbekenntnis und ideologisches Beiwerk ist,
das ohne Veränderung der Substanz auch weggelassen werden kann, sondern
den theoretischen und methodischen Kern ausmacht, aus dem heraus die
Eigenart und Bedeutung der Einzelausführungen allein verständlich werden.«
(p. 5)
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Ines and my collaboration was productive, but also produced some controversy.
Michael Cole, who somehow had obtained a copy of the manuscript while it was
under peer review at the journal OUTLINES, wanted us to withdraw it, because,
so he felt, it was destructive to the community of scholars pursuing cultural-his-
torical and sociocultural studies of mind. In contrast, I felt that Ines and I were
central to the community and that we would be acting against the spirit of dia-
lectical materialist theory if we did not contribute to iron out the logical contra-
dictions that plague our field on the inside. This constant reworking of theory
to make it suitable to describe and understand praxis, including our own, is at
the very heart of Marx’s method (e.g., Il’enkov 1982). In all of this, the work
with Ines has been fruitful, as she is far from applying Holzkamp’s ideas in a
routine, rote, and uncritical fashion. Rather, she is at times openly critical, such
as when she challenged his analytical categories of learning when the data she
had collected did not support the idea of conflicts that arise from power relations
in repressive institutions (Langemeyer & Nissen 2005).
8. Coda
I have found and continue to find the Grundlegung to be an important piece of
work, not in the least because of two of its features: (a) building a social science
that can account for its own emergence after anthropogenesis and culture have
released the species from its direct determinations by the environment and (b) a
rigorous method for constructing categories and concepts in a bottom-up manner
rather taking them from the everyday world and reifying them scientifically. I
take the position that only a critical psychology, as a critical (reflexive) sociology,
can be a science, because a science that does not deal with the origins of its con-
cepts and categories literally does not know what it is doing. I do not advocate
elevating the Grundlegung to the status of a religious text surrounded by a circle
of high priests that pretends to have better insights than anyone else to reading
and appropriating Holzkamp. More so, as a true Marxist, Holzkamp could not
have wanted to impede with those who pick out the logically weak spots in his
work and to transform it consistently with a rigorous (not rigid) materialist dia-
lectical method. This methods demands that »far from fearing contradictions in
the theoretical definition of the object, [that] one must search for these contra-
dictions in a goal-directed manner and record them precisely – to find their ratio-
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nal resolution, of course, not to pile up maintains of antinomies and paradoxes
in theoretical definitions of the thing« (Il’enkov 1982, 244). The problems are
rationally resolved in »the movement of objective reality, the movement and de-
velopment of the world of things ‘in themselves’« (p. 244). It is precisely in the
concerns with and for the practical reality that surrounds us that Klaus Holzkamp
has given us an impetus and method for further development.
I do not want to end without some reflexive comment. First, I understand
my reading and reception of Holzkamp and Critical Psychology as a concrete
realization of the possibilities that come with the publications of these texts. This
reading is grounded in my subjectivity (inherently a concrete realization of inter-
subjective possibilities), in and as of singular reading, but it is also an objective
achievement, which has left concrete traces wherever I have drawn on and refe-
renced Holzkamp’s work. It is necessarily a positioned reception, which has to
be understood cultural-historically in the context of the suppositions, presuppo-
sitions, dispositions, and predispositions that come with any position that a ma-
terial human being cannot but receive and must take.
A second reflexive comment concerns my choice of writing in English. Alt-
hough I read German quite well – having lived in the country for a quarter cen-
tury, a little less than half of my life – I have never learned to write (well) in this
language, especially not concerning the topics that I approach here. More so, at
issue is not a simple translation from one code into another; the real issue is that
the genres of writing and thinking in German and English differ radically. I know
this from my extended experience as editor, where I can pick out an article written
by a German scholar just from the way in which it and its argument are construc-
ted. Readers should and must understand that on cultural-historical grounds I
cannot think/write but in and out of my (North American) context. Therefore,
as English is my main language and a hybridized immigrant culture is my culture,
this language and this culture are also the ones in and with which my thinking
normally develops as I write. (There is an implicit head nod to Vygotsky [1986]
and his work on the relation of thinking and speaking/writing.) Even though
many may consider me fluent in German (and French), the fluency required for
academic, written discourse is very different from that required in oral commu-
nication even if this is at professional conferences. For better or worse, my essay
therefore also is a concrete realization of the possibly naïve reception that the
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work of Klaus Holzkamp may and does receive in North America. This, too, is
a phenomenon we must understand from the subject position that had been at
the heart of Holzkamp’s concerns, the concrete realizations of general (cross-)
cultural possibilities in and by the subjects that constitutively produce and repro-
duce society as a whole.
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Endnotes
1 I follow the convention to denote critical forms of psychology with small
letters (critical psychology) and use the capital letter form Critical Psychology
to denote the Berlin group and realization of critical psychology.
2 Again, the English has greater difficulties than other language to discriminate:
Where French and German have Être/Sein and étant/Seiendes, the English
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only has “being.” In scholarly writing, the term is adapted so that
Being/beings are used to produce equivalent distinctions.
3 From afar, it sometimes appears to me that there are “high priests” among
Critical Psychologists and followers of Holzkamp, who, despite their demo-
cratic and critical discourses – perhaps precisely because of them – act as if
they know more than anyone else on the topic.
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